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ARTICLE 
Interim Measures in Response to the Criminal 
Prosecution of Corporations and Their 
Employees by Host States in Parallel with 
Investment Arbitration Proceedings 
HENRY G. BURNETT AND JESSICA BEESS UND CHROSTIN
†
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”) provide important 
protections to investors conducting business in foreign countries 
(“Host States”).  These protections often include the right to have 
potential claims against the Host State heard in international 
investment arbitration (“investor-state arbitration” or “investment 
arbitration”), as opposed to domestic courts.  At the same time, 
however, the Host State retains its fundamental right to prosecute 
individuals and entities, including foreign investors and their 
employees, for criminal wrongdoing, where the State sees fit.  These 
dual spheres of authority may overlap and sometimes, in practice, 
form concentric circles that raise difficult questions regarding the 
appropriate limits on the prosecutorial power of the State and the 
jurisdictional reach of the arbitral tribunal.  Where an investor might 
see a violation of international law and its right to protection under a 
BIT, the Host State may see an investor’s conduct as a violation of its 
 
 †  Henry G. Burnett is a Partner at King & Spalding LLP. Jessica Beess und 
Chrostin is an associate at King & Spalding LLP. The views expressed herein do 
not necessarily represent those of King & Spalding LLP or its clients. 
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domestic criminal laws. 
A variety of issues arise at the intersection of domestic criminal 
law and international investment arbitration.  In some instances, the 
State may use criminal prosecution of an investor or its corporate 
employees as retaliation for the investor’s institution of an investor-
state arbitration; criminal prosecution—even where justified—may 
aggravate the investment dispute.  In other cases, the State’s pursuit 
of criminal charges may overlap with the arbitral tribunal’s 
jurisdiction to determine the merits of the investment dispute and 
may require determination of issues that the tribunal has been asked 
by the investor to resolve.  Elsewhere, the State’s criminal 
prosecution of an investor may form part of the State’s defense in the 
investment arbitration itself, i.e., where the State alleges that the 
investment was illegally obtained.  Yet another possibility is that 
criminal prosecutions may constitute an element of the Host State’s 
allegedly illegal conduct as, for instance, in the case of a creeping 
expropriation. 
When faced with criminal prosecution by a Host State where an 
investor already has instituted investor-state arbitration, the investor 
may, in appropriate circumstances, seek redress in the form of a 
request for interim relief from the arbitral tribunal.  But how do we 
determine the proper boundaries of these potentially overlapping 
systems of dispute resolution?  What is the proper limit on the State’s 
right to prosecute allegedly criminal conduct while an investment 
arbitration is pending?  What is the proper limit on the arbitral 
tribunal’s power to order a State to desist from exercising its inherent 
right as sovereign State to conduct criminal investigations and 
prosecutions? 
This article attempts to distill some answers to these questions 
from a review and analysis of recent case law in investor-state 
arbitrations.  Section I provides an overview of interim measures in 
international arbitration generally, focusing on a discussion of the 
relevant institutional arbitration rules in investor-state arbitrations.  
Section II focuses on recent investment arbitrations in which 
investors have sought interim measures to prevent a State from 
instituting or continuing criminal prosecutions against the investors.  
Section III attempts to distill from this case law some general 
principles applicable to requests for interim measures seeking to 
enjoin States from exercising their investigative and prosecutorial 
powers against foreign investors.  As the analysis of the case law 
makes clear, tribunals considering requests for interim measures that 
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would limit a State’s exercise of its sovereign powers impose a 
particularly high threshold on the moving party and require a 
showing of urgency and necessity, as well as a direct, tangible impact 
on the established rights of the parties to the arbitration. 
I. INTERIM MEASURES 
 A. Overview 
An interim measure (“IM”)1 is a grant of temporary relief 
awarded for the protection of a party’s rights pending the final 
resolution of a dispute.2  Most frequently, IMs have been granted to 
afford four types of relief: (i) to prevent publication to the media or to 
the public of matters disclosed in the course of the arbitration; (ii) to 
suspend or otherwise impact related litigation proceedings in a 
domestic forum; (iii) to preserve evidence that may be relevant to the 
conduct and outcome of the arbitration; and (iv) to order security for 
costs.  Often, especially in the case of IMs aimed at protecting and 
conserving relevant evidence, the success of the arbitration process 
itself depends on the issuance and enforcement of IMs.3  Destruction 
of evidence or alienation of assets may render the final arbitral award 
meaningless and lacking in legitimacy.  Thus, at their core, IMs are 
aimed at protecting the parties’ rights, as well as the integrity of the 
arbitral process. 
There are at least three distinct categories of rights that arbitral 
tribunals generally recognize as subject to protection through IMs:4 
the right to prevent contractual and legal rights that are the subject of 
the arbitration from being impaired or eviscerated prior to a final 
determination by the tribunal;5 the right to have the dispute decided 
 
 1. Interim measures are also commonly referred to as conservatory or 
provisional measures or remedies. For purposes of this article, these terms will be 
used interchangeably. IMs are generally available in both international commercial 
and investment arbitration. Because this article is concerned with IM applications 
and grants to prevent the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings, the 
main focus will be on IMs in international investment arbitration. 
 2. See e.g., Gregoire Marchac, Interim Measures in International Commercial 
Arbitration Under the ICC, AAA, LCIA and UNCITRAL Rules, 10 AM. REV. INT’L 
ARB. 123, 123–24 (1999). 
 3. GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: 
COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 2426 (2d ed. 2001). 
 4. Caline Mouawad & Elizabeth Silbert, A Guide to Interim Measures in 
Investor-State Arbitration, 29 ARB. INT’L, no. 3, 2013, at 381–94. 
 5. Id. at 394; see, e.g., City Oriente Limited v. The Republic of Ecuador and 
Empresa Estatal Petróleos del Ecuador (Petroecuador), ICSID Case No. 
ARB/06/21, Decision on Provisional Measures (Nov. 19, 2007); Burlington 
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by the international tribunal;6 and the right to protect a party’s 
procedural rights, including the right to preserve the status quo, to 
prevent the aggravation or exacerbation of the dispute, and to 
preserve the integrity of the arbitral proceedings.7 As the discussion 
infra in Section II will illustrate, this last category is at the forefront 
of the discussion regarding IMs where parallel criminal proceedings 
are threatened or ongoing. 
 B. Authority to Grant Interim Measures 
As L. Yves Fortier has observed, “[a] tribunal’s jurisdiction to 
order provisional measures is, like the parties’ arbitration agreement 
itself, a function of the parties’ consent.”8  When parties agree to 
resolve a dispute by recourse to arbitration, they are free to determine 
the parameters of the dispute resolution process and may adopt 
institutional arbitration rules that grant tribunals authority to issue 
IMs; alternatively, the parties may agree to restrict the tribunal’s 
authority to issue this form of relief.  For purposes of the present 
discussion of IMs to prevent the institution or continuation of 
criminal proceedings, two sets of institutional arbitration rules are 
relevant: the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
 
Resources Inc. and others v. Republic of Ecuador and Empresa Estatal Petróleos 
del Ecuador (Petroecuador), ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Procedural Order No. 1 on 
Burlington Oriente’s Request for Provisional Measures (June 29, 2009); Perenco 
Ecuador Ltd. v. The Republic of Ecuador and Empresa Estatal Petróleos del 
Ecuador (Petroecuador), ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6, Decision on Provisional 
Measures (May 8, 2009); Tethyan Copper Company Pty Limited v. The Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/1, Decision on Claimant’s Request 
for Provisional Measures (Dec. 13, 2012). 
 6. Mouawad & Silbert, supra note 4, at 394; see also Electricity Company of 
Sofia and Bulgaria (Belgium v. Bulgaria), Interim Measures of Protection, 1939 
P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 79 (Dec. 5, 1939); Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. v. 
Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, Procedural Order No. 4 (Jan. 11, 
1999) 5 ICSID Rep. 4 (2002). 
 7. See Mouawad & Silbert, supra note 4, at 394 (noting that that at least one 
case has held that “the general rights to attract foreign investment, regulate and 
promote foreign investment, enforce regulations, and protect its [the State’s] 
reputation are not ‘rights in dispute that could warrant the recommendation or 
provisional measures.”) (citing Churchill Mining PLC v. Republic of Indonesia, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/12/14, Procedural Order No. 3, Provisional Measures, ¶ 50 
(Mar., 4 2013)); see also Electricity Company; LaGrand Case (Germany v. United 
States of America), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, 1999 I.C.J. 
(Mar. 3, 1999); Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Order No. 
1 Claimant’s Request for Provisional Measures (July, 1 2003); City Oriente, supra 
note 5. 
 8. L. Yves Fortier, Interim Measures: An Arbitrator’s Provisional Views, 
Fordham Law School Conference on International Arbitration and Mediation, 3 
(June 16, 2008), available at http://www.arbitration icca.org/media/0/12232952989
920/1115_001.pdf. 
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Disputes’ Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals of Other States (the “ICSID 
Convention”); and the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law Arbitration Rules of 1976 (the “1976 UNCITRAL 
Rules”) and as revised in 2010 (the “2010 UNCITRAL Rules”).9 
 1. The ICSID Convention 
The ICSID Convention addresses IMs in Article 47, which 
provides as follows. 
Except as the parties otherwise agree, the Tribunal 
may, if it considers that the circumstances so require, 
recommend any provisional measures which should be 
taken to preserve the respective rights of either party.10 
This provision expressly acknowledges the parties’ right to 
restrict the arbitral tribunal’s authority to award interim relief, but 
otherwise affords the arbitrators broad discretion, circumscribed only 
by the requirement that the tribunal consider that “the circumstances 
so require” interim relief. Rule 39 of the 2006 ICSID Rules of 
Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (the “ICSID Arbitration 
Rules”) provides some further guidance and states that: 
(1) At any time after the institution of the proceeding, 
a party may request that provisional measures for 
the preservation of its rights be recommended by 
the Tribunal. The request shall specify the rights to 
be preserved, the measures the recommendation of 
which is requested, and the circumstances that 
require such measures. 
 
(2) The Tribunal shall give priority to the 
consideration of a request made pursuant to 
paragraph (1). 
 
(3) The Tribunal may also recommend provisional 
 
 9. IMs are available in both commercial and investor-state arbitration. 
Accordingly, most, if not all, institutional arbitration rules have provisions 
regarding IMs. See, e.g., INT’L CHAMBER OF COMM. R. OF ARB. art. 28 
(“Conservatory and Interim Measures”); ARB. R. OF THE STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF 
COMM. art 32 (“Interim Measures”); INT’L CTR. FOR DISP. RES. P. art 24 (“Interim 
Measures”). As this article is not concerned with IMs in international commercial 
arbitration, a discussion of these rules is outside its scope. 
 10. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States art 47, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 
159, 17 U.S.T. 1270. 
04 - BURNETTBEESUNDCHROSTIN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/6/2015  10:32 AM 
36 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 30 
measures on its own initiative or recommend 
measures other than those specified in a request. It 
may at any time modify or revoke its 
recommendations. 
 
(4) The Tribunal shall only recommend provisional 
measures, or modify or revoke its 
recommendations, after giving each party an 
opportunity of presenting its observations. 
 
(5) If a party makes a request pursuant to paragraph 
(1) before constitution of the Tribunal, the 
Secretary-General shall, on the application of 
either party, fix time limits for the parties to 
present observations on the request, so that the 
request and observations may be considered by the 
Tribunal promptly upon its constitution. 
 
(6) Nothing in this Rule shall prevent the parties, 
provided that they have so stipulated in the 
agreement recording their consent, from requesting 
any judicial or other authority to order provisional 
measures, prior to or after the institution of the 
proceeding, for the preservation of their respective 
rights and interests. 11 
Under Rule 39 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules, a party may 
request IMs at any time after instituting the arbitration proceeding, 
even before the constitution of the arbitral tribunal.  The request for 
IMs must include three elements: (i) a statement of the rights the 
party seeks to preserve by requesting the IMs; (ii) a statement of the 
measures it requests; and (iii) a discussion of the circumstances 
justifying and/or necessitating the grant of IMs. 
If a party requests IMs before the tribunal is properly 
constituted, the Secretary-General of ICSID may, upon the parties’ 
request, set a schedule for briefing the IM request and opposition, so 
that the tribunal may turn to this issue immediately upon its 
constitution.  Further, Rule 39(3) clarifies that the tribunal is free to 
recommend IMs on its own initiative and to subsequently modify or 
revoke any IM it recommends.12 
Importantly, the use of the word “recommend,” as opposed to 
 
 11. Id. at r. 39. 
 12. Id. 
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“order,” does not render the tribunal’s determination with regard to 
IMs under the ICSID Convention and Rules any less binding than 
IMs ordered under other institutional arbitration rules like the 
UNCITRAL Rules, discussed below.  Redfern and Hunter explain 
that: “[t]he use of the word ‘recommend’ in this context stems from 
the concern of the drafters of the ICSID Convention to be seen as 
respectful of national sovereignty by not granting powers to private 
tribunals to order a state to do or not do something on a purely 
provisional basis.”13  Initially, as Schreuer confirms, “a conscious 
decision was made not to grant the tribunal the power to order 
binding provisional measures.”14  However, as investor-state tribunals 
continued to apply the ICSID Convention and Rules in adjudicating 
requests for IMs, tribunal determinations on IMs have emerged as 
binding.  As the tribunal in Maffezini stated, “[t]he Tribunal’s 
authority to rule on provisional measures is not less binding than that 
of a final award. Accordingly, for the purposes of this order, the 
tribunal deems the word ‘recommend’ to be of equivalent value as 
the word ‘order.’”15 
 2. The 1976 and 2010 UNCITRAL Rules 
Under the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules, the power of the arbitral 
tribunal to award interim relief is set forth in Articles 15(1), 26(1), 
and 26(2), which provide: 
Article 15(1): Subject to these Rules, the arbitral 
tribunal may conduct the arbitration in such manner as 
it considers appropriate, provided that the parties are 
treated with equality and that at any stage of the 
proceedings each party is given a full opportunity of 
presenting his case.  
 
Article 26(1): At the request of either party, the 
arbitral tribunal may take any interim measures it 
 
 13. REDFERN AND HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 333 (Sweet & Maxwell, 4th ed. 2004). 
 14. CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 758 
(Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
 15. Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/97/7, Procedural Order No. 2, ¶ 9 (Oct. 28, 1999) 5 ICSID Rep. 11 (2002); 
see also Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Order No. 1 
Claimant’s Request for Provisional Measures, ¶ 4 (July 1, 2003) (“It is to be 
recalled that, according to a well-established principle laid down by the 
jurisprudence of the ICSID tribunals, provisional measures ‘recommended’ by an 
ICSID tribunal are legally compulsory; they are in effect ‘ordered’ by the tribunal 
and the parties are under a legal obligation to comply with them.”). 
04 - BURNETTBEESUNDCHROSTIN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/6/2015  10:32 AM 
38 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 30 
deems necessary in respect of the subject-matter of the 
dispute, including measures for the conservation of the 
goods forming the subject-matter in dispute, such as 
ordering their deposit with a third person or the sale of 
perishable goods. 
 
Article 26(2): Such interim measures may be 
established in the form of an interim award. The 
arbitral tribunal shall be entitled to require security for 
the cost of such measures.16 
The 1976 UNCITRAL Rules, like the ICSID Convention and 
Rules, afford the arbitral tribunal broad discretion with regard to 
awarding IMs.  However, the UNCITRAL Rules differ in many 
significant respects from the relevant provisions under the ICSID 
regime.  Notably, it is unclear from the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules 
whether the arbitral tribunal has discretion to recommend IMs on its 
own initiative.  On the one hand, Article 15(1) states that the tribunal 
is free to conduct the proceedings as it sees fit, subject only to the 
requirement to treat all parties equally and to give the parties a full 
opportunity to present their respective cases.  On the other hand, 
Article 26 expressly grants the parties the right to request IMs, but 
omits to grant such a right to the tribunal. Under customary 
international law rules of interpretation, ordinarily, expressio unius 
est exclusio alterius,17 suggesting that a tribunal constituted under the 
1976 UNCITRAL Rules may not have authority to recommend IMs 
at its own initiative.  Further, the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules do not 
address the tribunal’s power to amend an IM order after its initial 
issuance, nor do the rules address the timing of requests for IMs. 
This lack of clarity in the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules meant that 
“little legal consensus existed as to the proper scope and 
implementation of interim measures in international arbitration[s]” 
conducted under these rules.18  IMs thus became one of the issues 
most heavily modified when the UNCITRAL Rules were revisited 
and revised in 2010.  As one commentator notes, “[i]n particular, the 
new Arbitration Rules unify and clarify the function of interim 
measures in international arbitration and are intended for universal 
 
 16. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 31/98, UN DOC. A/RES/31/28 
(Dec. 15, 1976). 
 17. “The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1913 (10th ed. 2014). 
 18. Lee Anna Tucker, Note, Interim Measures under Revised UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules: Comparison to Model Law Reflects both Greater Flexibility and 
Remaining Uncertainty, 1 INT’L COMM. ARB. BRIEF, no. 2, 2011, at 16. 
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application.”19  Since the UNCITRAL Rules may be used in both 
commercial and investor-state arbitrations, the focus of the 2010 
UNCITRAL Rules’ provision on IMs is both to make the rules 
applicable to all types of arbitration regardless of the subject matter 
of the dispute and to provide increased guidance on the 
circumstances, conditions, and procedures for granting IMs.20 
Unlike the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules, the 2010 revision provides 
extensive detail on the definition of interim measures under the 
UNCITRAL Rules, the purposes for which IMs may be granted, the 
test for granting a request for IMs, and the scope of the tribunal’s 
power to amend, suspend, or terminate a granted IM.21  Notably, the 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on 
the Work of its Forty-Fifth Session, ¶¶ 17–18, delivered to the General Assembly, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/614 (Oct. 5, 2006) [hereinafter 2006 Working Group Report]. 
 21. Article 26 of the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules provides as follows: 
1. The arbitral tribunal may, at the request of a party, grant interim 
measures. 
2. An interim measure is any temporary measure by which, at any time 
prior to the issuance of the award by which the dispute is finally 
decided, the arbitral tribunal orders a party, for example and without 
limitation, to: 
(a) Maintain or restore the status quo pending determination of the 
dispute; 
(b) Take action that would prevent, or refrain from taking action that 
is likely to cause, (i) current or imminent harm or (ii) prejudice to 
the arbitral process itself; 
(c) Provide a means of preserving assets out of which a subsequent 
award may be satisfied; or 
(d) Preserve evidence that may be relevant and material to the 
resolution of the dispute. 
3. The party requesting an interim measure under paragraphs 2(a) to (c) 
shall satisfy the arbitral tribunal that: 
(a) Harm not adequately reparable by an award of damages is likely 
to result if the measure is not ordered, and such harm substantially 
outweighs the harm that is likely to result to the party against whom 
the measure is directed if the measure is granted; and 
(b) There is a reasonable possibility that the requesting party will 
succeed on the merits of the claim. The determination on this 
possibility shall not affect the discretion of the arbitral tribunal in 
making any subsequent determination. 
4. With regard to a request for an interim measure under paragraph 
2(d), the requirements in paragraphs 3(a) and (b) shall apply only to the 
extent the arbitral tribunal considers appropriate. 
5. The arbitral tribunal may modify, suspend or terminate an interim 
measure it has granted, upon application of any party or, in exceptional 
circumstances and upon prior notice to the parties on the arbitral 
tribunal’s own initiative. 
6. The arbitral tribunal may require the party requesting an interim 
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2010 UNCITRAL Rules Working Group deleted the words “in 
respect of the subject-matter of the dispute” from the Arbitration 
Rules as being “overly restrictive” as to what circumstances may 
justify interim measures.22  Thus, while the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules 
are in many ways more detailed and specific than the earlier 1976 
version, they are also broader in some respects.  Since no requests for 
IMs to prohibit the institution or continuation of criminal proceedings 
against an investor and/or its corporate executives have been decided 
under the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules to date, it remains to be seen how, 
if at all, the revised rules will change the availability of IMs in these 
situations. 
II. RECENT CASES INVOLVING INTERIM MEASURES TO PROHIBIT THE 
INSTITUTION OR CONTINUATION OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 
Tribunals in at least seven ICSID and two UNCITRAL cases 
have addressed requests for protection in the face of a Host State’s 
pursuit of criminal charges. 
 A. Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine 
The arbitral tribunal in Tokios Tokelés was the first tribunal to 
hold that it had authority to grant a provisional measures request to 
enjoin a Host State from continuing criminal prosecution of an 
investor’s corporate executives.23  In this case, the claimant was an 
investor company that carried on a “business in Ukraine in the 
advertising, printing, publishing and allied trades, under the control 
and management of two brothers, Mr. Oleksandr V. Danylov and Mr. 
 
measure to provide appropriate security in connection with the 
measure. 
7. The arbitral tribunal may require any party promptly to disclose any 
material change in the circumstances on the basis of which the interim 
measure was requested or granted. 
8. The party requesting an interim measure may be liable for any costs 
and damages caused by the measure to any party if the arbitral tribunal 
later determines that, in the circumstances then prevailing, the measure 
should not have been granted. The arbitral tribunal may award such 
costs and damages at any point during the proceedings. 
9. A request for interim measures address by any party to a judicial 
authority shall not be deemed incompatible with the agreement to 
arbitrate, or as a waiver of that agreement. 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 65/22, UN Doc. A/RES/65/22 (Dec. 
6, 2010). 
 22. 2006 Working Group Report, supra note 17, at ¶ 105. 
 23. See Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Order No. 1, 
Claimant’s Request for Provisional Measures, ¶ 1 (July 1, 2003). 
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Serhiy V. Danylov.”24  Among other things, the claimant alleged that 
its company was the subject of a targeted and long-running campaign 
of oppression by State agencies, ultimately culminating in a wrongful 
expropriation of the claimant’s investment.  During the pendency of 
the investment arbitration, the claimant filed a request for provisional 
measures, requesting the tribunal to order the respondent to “refrain 
from, suspend, and discontinue: (i) the criminal proceedings against 
O.V. Danylov, General Director of Claimant’s subsidiaries in 
Ukraine; (ii) the arrest of assets of Claimant’s subsidiaries in 
Ukraine; and (iii) tax investigations of Claimant’s subsidiaries in 
Ukraine.”25  Only the first request is relevant to the present 
discussion. 
In its Order No. 3, the tribunal discussed Article 47 of the ICSID 
Convention and Arbitration Rule 39, as well as prior investor-state 
arbitrations addressing requests for interim relief.26  The tribunal 
concluded that: “[t]he circumstances under which provisional 
measures are required under Article 47 are those in which the 
measures are necessary to preserve a party’s rights and that need is 
urgent.”27  IMs are necessary “where the actions of a party are 
capable of causing or of threatening irreparable prejudice to the rights 
invoked,”28 and they are urgent where “action prejudicial to the rights 
of either party is likely to be taken before such final decision is 
taken.”29  The tribunal proceeded to note that the respondent was 
incorrect in arguing that criminal proceedings against an employee of 
the investor cannot be the subject of a provisional measure because 
such proceedings are not part of a legal dispute arising directly out of 
the claimant’s investment.  The tribunal stated that: 
It is not necessary for a tribunal to establish that the 
actions complained of in a request for provisional 
measures meet the jurisdictional requirements of 
Article 25 [of the ICSID Convention]. A tribunal may 
order a provisional measure if the actions of the 
 
 24. Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Award, ¶ 2 (July 
26, 2007). 
 25. Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Order No. 3, ¶ 2 
(Jan. 18, 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 26. Id. ¶ 6 et seq. 
 27. Id. ¶ 8 (citing CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A 
COMMENTARY 751–57 (Cambridge U. Press 2001)). 
 28. Id. ¶ 8 (citing Separate Opinion of President Jiménez de Aréchaga, Aegean 
Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turk.), 1976 I.C.J. 3, 16.). 
 29. Id. ¶ 8 (citing Order of 29 Jul. 1991, Case Concerning Passage Through the 
Great Belt (Fin. v. Den.), 1991 I.C.J. 12, ¶ 23). 
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opposing party “relate to the subject matter of the case 
before the tribunal and not to separate, unrelated 
issues or extraneous matters.”30 
Having established that criminal proceedings may properly be 
the subject of IMs, however, the tribunal ultimately concluded that 
the request for IMs should not be granted in this instance to enjoin 
the criminal proceedings against O.V. Danylov.31  The tribunal 
reasoned that the claimant had failed to show that a provisional 
measure was either necessary or urgent to protect its rights.  
Importantly, the tribunal looked to the timing of the institution of the 
criminal proceedings and noted that they were initiated nine months 
before the claimant registered its ICSID claim, yet the claimant did 
not include the criminal proceedings in its prior request for 
provisional measures.  Consequently, the claimant could not now 
credibly claim that IMs were urgent. 
 B. City Oriente v. Ecuador 
In City Oriente, the claimant initiated ICSID arbitration 
proceedings against Ecuador following amendments to the 
Hydrocarbon Law purporting to unilaterally modify the parties’ 
hydrocarbon production-sharing contract.32  City Oriente refused to 
comply with the amended law, and in response, the State Attorney 
General of Ecuador announced that a criminal complaint against City 
Oriente’s representatives and managers would be filed on the basis of 
the investor’s non-compliance with the new Hydrocarbon Law.  City 
Oriente requested interim measures to maintain the status quo ante 
after the State Attorney General of Ecuador made this announcement.  
And in fact, during the pendency of the IM request, two criminal 
complaints were filed against the claimant’s executives.  In its 
Decision on Provisional Measures, the tribunal stated that a tribunal 
determining applications for IMs may and should take into 
consideration whether the adoption of the IMs is necessary to 
preserve the petitioner’s rights, whether their ordering is urgent, and 
whether each party has been afforded an opportunity to raise 
observations.33 
 
 30. Id. ¶ 11 (citing Emilio Augustín Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/97/7, Procedural Order No. 2, ¶ 23 (Oct. 28, 1999)). 
 31. Id. at ¶¶ 12–13. 
 32. City Oriente Limited v. The Republic of Ecuador and Empresa Estatal 
Petróleos del Ecuador (Petroecuador), ICSID Case No. ARB/06/21, Decision on 
Provisional Measures, ¶¶ 1–5 (Nov. 19, 2007). 
 33. Id. ¶ 54. 
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The tribunal looked at each of these factors in turn and granted 
City Oriente’s IM request, finding that City Oriente met all three 
considerations.34  More specifically, the tribunal found that the main 
purpose of provisional measures in ICSID arbitrations is to preserve 
the status quo ante, and that this was precisely what the claimant 
sought to do: 
In other words, it is the Tribunal’s view that Article 47 
of the Convention provides authorization for the 
passing of provisional measures prohibiting any action 
that affects the disputed rights, aggravates the dispute, 
frustrates the effectiveness of the award or entails 
having either party take justice into their own hands. 
Where there is an agreement in place between the 
parties that has so far defined the framework of their 
mutual obligations, then the rights to be preserved are, 
precisely, those that were thereby agreed upon.35 
Although the tribunal noted that it had great respect for the 
Ecuadorian judiciary and acknowledged that Ecuador’s sovereign 
authority included the right to prosecute and punish crimes 
perpetrated in its territory, the tribunal found that Ecuador was using 
the prosecution “as a means to coactively secure payment of the 
amounts allegedly owed by City Oriente pursuant to [the new 
Hydrocarbons Law].”36  Since the legality of the new law and its 
application to City Oriente were precisely the subject of the 
arbitration, the tribunal found that Ecuador’s prosecutions would 
violate the principle that neither party may aggravate or extend a 
dispute or take justice into its own hands.  The tribunal therefore 
ordered the parties to abide by the contract as it was originally 
executed and ordered Ecuador to suspend the criminal proceedings 
against City Oriente’s executives. 
 C. Caratube v. Kazakhstan 
In Caratube, the claimant initiated ICSID arbitration 
proceedings against Kazakhstan after that State unilaterally 
terminated a contract for the exploration and production of 
hydrocarbons.37  Despite the termination, Caratube continued to 
 
 34. Id. ¶ 83. 
 35. Id. ¶ 55. 
 36. Id. ¶ 62. 
 37. Caratube International Oil Company LLP v. The Republic of Kazakhstan, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/08/12, Decision Regarding Claimant’s Application for 
Provisional Measures, ¶ 4 (July 31, 2009). 
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operate certain oil wells to avoid adverse technical consequences, 
and, in response, Kazakhstan initiated criminal proceedings against 
Caratube and its directors for the unlawful continued operation of the 
wells.  The claimant requested interim measures ordering 
Kazakhstani authorities to refrain from acting upon any existing 
criminal complaints or to file any new criminal complaints against 
the claimant. 
In its Decision Regarding Claimant’s Application for 
Provisional Measures, the tribunal cited Tokios Tokelés with approval 
and pointed to the language of ICSID Article 47 and Rule 39, stating 
that the rule does not indicate that any specific state action must be 
excluded from the scope of possible provisional measures.38  Rather, 
“this broad language can be interpreted to the effect that, in principle, 
criminal investigations may not be totally excluded from the scope of 
provisional measures in ICSID proceedings.”39  However, in 
recognition of the state’s sovereign right to prosecute crime, “a 
particularly high threshold must be overcome before an ICSID 
tribunal can indeed recommend provisional measures regarding 
criminal investigations conducted by a state.”40  The tribunal held that 
the claimant did not meet this particularly high threshold.  The 
claimant failed to show, according to the tribunal, that its procedural 
right to continue with the ICSID arbitration would be precluded by 
the criminal investigation, and further, since the claimant sought 
monetary damages rather than injunctive relief, any additional harm 
to the claimant could be examined and determined at a later stage in 
the proceedings.41  For these reasons there was neither necessity nor 
urgency supporting the claimant’s IM application. 
 D. Quiborax v. Bolivia 
In Quiborax v. Bolivia, Quiborax, alongside Non Metallic 
Minerals (NMM) and Allan Fosk Kaplún, instituted ICSID 
arbitration proceedings against Bolivia, seeking compensation for 
damages following the Host State’s revocation of eleven mining 
concessions.42  Bolivia initiated criminal proceedings against the co-
claimants and other related individuals on the ground that they had 
 
 38. Id. ¶ 54 et seq. 
 39. Id. ¶ 136. 
 40. Id. ¶ 137. 
 41. Id. ¶¶ 139–40. 
 42. Quiborax S.A., Non Metallic Minerals S.A. and Allan Fosk Kaplún v. 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/2, Decision on Provisional 
Measures, ¶ 4 (Feb. 26, 2010). 
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allegedly forged a document establishing that Quiborax and Mr. Fosk 
were NMM shareholders and thus protected investors under the 
Bolivia-Chile BIT. 
Although the subject matter of the criminal proceedings was the 
prosecution of the investors’ alleged crimes of forgery and fraud, the 
tribunal found that the criminal proceedings could properly be the 
subject of IMs since the crimes at issue were directly related to the 
arbitration.  The subject matter of the criminal proceedings could be 
outcome determinative for the investors’ access to the arbitration, 
and, in fact, “this access to ICSID arbitration is expressly deemed to 
constitute the harm caused to Bolivia that is required as one of the 
constituent elements of the crimes prosecuted.”43 
After establishing its authority to grant IMs on the subject matter 
of the request, the tribunal proceeded to address the requirements for 
a successful IM application.  In its Decision on Provisional Measures, 
the tribunal found that the ICSID Convention and Rules required the 
satisfaction of a three-pronged test before a tribunal could grant 
provisional measures: (i) the rights to be protected through the IM 
must exist and the IM must be both (ii) urgent and (iii) necessary.44  
The tribunal found all three requirements satisfied and granted the 
request for IMs. 
Importantly, the tribunal expressly declared that it had full 
respect for Bolivia’s sovereign right to prosecute crimes committed 
in its territory, but also found that the criminal prosecutions appeared 
to target the claimants in the arbitration because they had initiated the 
arbitration.45  The tribunal reasoned that Bolivia’s institution of the 
 
 43. Id. ¶ 120. 
 44. Id. ¶ 113. 
 45. Id. ¶ 121. ¶ 121 provides as follows: 
In addition, although the Tribunal has every respect for Bolivia’s 
sovereign right to prosecute crimes committed within its territory, the 
evidence in the record suggests that the criminal proceedings were 
initiated as a result of a corporate audit that targeted Claimants because 
they had initiated this arbitration. Indeed, the Querella Criminal 
expressly states that the alleged irregularities in Claimants’ corporate 
documentation were deterred in consideration of (“en atención a”) the 
Request for Arbitration filed by Claimants against Bolivia. Lorena 
Fernández, one of the authors of Informe 001/2005, testified that the 
corporate audit was made at the request of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in the context of an arbitration proceeding and was aimed at 
establishing whether the shareholders in NMM were Chilean nationals. 
Indeed, the very content of Informe 001/2005 suggests that the 
underlying motivation for the audit was to serve Bolivia in the defense 
of this arbitration claim, as it contained specific recommendations for 
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criminal proceedings in essence amounted to a “defense strategy”46 
and concluded that the State must execute its prosecutorial powers 
“in good faith and respecting Claimants’ rights, including their prima 
facie right to pursue this arbitration.”47  Because the tribunal found 
that the criminal proceedings were directly related to the arbitration 
and that Bolivia’s investigation formed part of its defense to the 
arbitration claim, the tribunal ordered Bolivia to take appropriate 
measures to suspend the criminal proceedings, finding that they 
threatened the procedural integrity of the arbitration—in particular, 
the claimants’ right of access to evidence through witnesses.48  
However, the tribunal rejected the claimants’ contention that the 
criminal proceedings threatened the exclusivity of the arbitration, 
aggravated the dispute, or had modified the status quo ante. 
 E. Von Pezold, et al. v. Zimbabwe 
In Von Pezold, the claimants held investments in three large 
estates that produced timber, tobacco, tea, coffee, and macadamia 
nuts in Zimbabwe.49  The claimants instituted two ICSID arbitrations 
seeking restitution and damages for the alleged expropriation of those 
estates. 
On June 11, 2012, the claimants received a letter from 
Zimbabwe’s Attorney General requesting that the claimants disclose 
certain documents in connection with the arbitrations and threatening 
to institute criminal proceedings if they refused.50  The next day, on 
June 12, 2012, the claimants filed a request for provisional measures 
with the ICSID tribunal.  One day later, the president of the tribunal, 
L. Yves Fortier, ruled on claimants’ application, directing Zimbabwe 
to refrain from taking any action in connection with its letter to the 
claimants of June 11, 2012. 
Exceptionally, the decision provided no reasons supporting the 
tribunal’s grant of interim measures.  The President of the tribunal 
 
such defense. 
See also id. ¶ 119 (“It is evident from the record that the criminal proceedings 
are related to, and may even be motivated by, the ICSID arbitration.”). 
 46. Id. ¶ 122. 
 47. Id. ¶ 123. 
 48. Id. ¶ 148. 
 49. German Farmers Take Case to ICSID, THE ZIMBABWEAN (July 20, 2010, 
8:07 AM), http://www.thezimbabwean.co/politics/33109/german-farmers-take-
case-to-icsid.html. 
 50. Bernhard von Pezold and Others v. Republic of Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/10/15, Directions Concerning Claimants’ Application for Provisional 
Measures of 12 June 2012, ¶ 3 (June 13, 2012). 
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merely alluded to the “potential consequences that might result from 
[Zimbabwe’s] proposed actions.”51  The lack of reasoning may be 
explained by the apparent urgency of the threat and the short time 
between the request for interim measures and the issuance of the 
order granting the request. 
 F. Lao Holdings v. The Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
In Lao Holdings, the claimant owned investments in various 
gambling establishments in Laos and brought an ICSID Additional 
Facility arbitration to seek damages for alleged expropriation of their 
investments through confiscatory taxation and other government 
measures.52  At the time of institution of the ICSID arbitration, there 
were ongoing court proceedings seeking to hold the claimant 
accountable for $20 million in back taxes as well as an investigation 
into money laundering allegations against the claimant.53  The 
investor sought provisional measures to prevent the government from 
continuing these proceedings. 
In an unpublished decision, the tribunal granted the investor’s 
provisional measures request, prohibiting the respondent State from 
“taking any steps that would alter the status quo ante or aggravate the 
dispute.”54  Notably, the respondent apparently consented to stay the 
proceedings as part of its “conciliatory efforts to allow the arbitration 
process to proceed in an environment conducive to timely action by 
the Tribunal.”55 
Subsequently, on the eve of the hearing on the merits, the 
respondent requested a modification of the tribunal’s Decision on 
Provisional Measures of September 17, 2013 to allow the respondent 
State to interview and depose potential witnesses and seek assistance 
from the government and courts of the U.S. and other countries to 
investigate the claimants’ alleged criminal activity.56 The tribunal 
dismissed the respondent’s request, citing in support of its decision 
the respondent’s initial agreement to the terms of the Decision on 
Provisional Measures and noting that: 
 
 51. Id. ¶ 7. 
 52. Lao Holdings N.V. v. The Lao People’s Democratic Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/12/6, Ruling on Motion to Amend the Provisional Measures Order, ¶ 
2 (May 30, 2014). 
 53. Id. ¶¶ 4(i), 48. 
 54. Id. ¶ 1. 
 55. Id. ¶ 4(i). 
 56. Id. ¶ 1. 
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[C]riminal proceedings launched in the midst of final 
preparations for the arbitration, and running 
concurrently with the hearing would considerably 
broaden and aggravate the dispute between the parties, 
in threatening the integrity of the arbitral process; and 
the Respondent has not established a change of 
circumstances sufficient to justify its proposed 
modification of the PMO or the necessity and urgency 
for so doing on the eve of the merits hearing.57 
This case is different from those discussed heretofore, since the 
respondent State originally agreed to discontinue the criminal 
proceedings, but later requested an amendment of the tribunal’s order 
to allow the State to re-launch the criminal investigation on the eve of 
the hearing on the merits.  Under these circumstances, the tribunal 
found that the respondent had to show urgency and necessity in order 
to obtain an amendment to the original IM order.58  Since the 
respondent failed to meet this burden, the tribunal denied the 
respondent’s request. 
 G. Churchill Mining and Planet Mining v. Indonesia 
In Churchill Mining, the claimants commenced an ICSID 
arbitration against Indonesia to dispute the revocation of four mining 
licenses.59  According to the claimants, they obtained these licenses 
through their partnership with a local group of companies called the 
Ridlamata Group.  On February 24, 2014, only days after the tribunal 
issued its decision upholding jurisdiction over the dispute, the Regent 
of East Kutai announced his intention to initiate criminal proceedings 
“against the Claimants and their witnesses.”60  On March 21, 2014, 
the Regent filed criminal charges against the Ridlamata Group on the 
ground of forgery of official documents.61 
Churchill Mining promptly filed an application for IMs on 
March 27, 2014, requesting among other things that Indonesia refrain 
from threatening or commencing any criminal investigation or 
 
 57. Id. ¶ 4(iii). 
 58. Id. ¶ 9. 
 59. Churchill Mining PLC and Planet Mining Pty Ltd v. Republic of Indonesia, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/12/14 and 12/40, Procedural Order No. 3, Provisional 
Measures, ¶ 4 (Mar. 4, 2013). 
 60. Churchill Mining PLC and Planet Mining Pty Ltd v. Republic of Indonesia, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/12/14 and 12/40, Procedural Order No. 9, Provisional 
Measures, ¶ 5 (July 8, 2014). 
 61. Id. ¶ 84. 
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prosecution against the claimants, their witnesses or any person 
associated with the claimants’ operations in Indonesia, and that 
Indonesia suspend or stay any pending criminal investigation against 
the claimants’ and their associates.62 
In deciding the claimants’ application, the tribunal stated in its 
Procedural Order No. 9 that: 
Various ICSID tribunals have interpreted these 
requirements [of ICSID Rule 39] to mean that 
provisional measures must (i) serve to protect certain 
rights of the applicant, (ii) meet the requirement of 
urgency; and (iii) the requirement of necessity, which 
implies the existence of a risk of irreparable or 
substantial harm.63 
The tribunal refused the request for provisional measures 
because, inter alia, the Ridlamata Group was not a party to the 
arbitration; no investigations or prosecutions against the claimants or 
their current witnesses had been commenced; and the urgency and 
necessity requirements were not met since the claimants’ rights were 
not affected by the proceedings against the Ridlamata Group, even 
though the claimants had business dealings with the Ridlamata 
Group.  This case follows the line of precedent adopting a high 
threshold for imposing IM orders on States to prohibit the institution 
or continuation of criminal proceedings.  Here, because the threat was 
exactly that—merely a threat—, the tribunal found that the 
requirements for IMs had not been satisfied. 
 H. Paushok v. Mongolia 
In Paushok, an investment arbitration under the 1976 
UNCITRAL Rules, the claimants alleged that the respondent State 
breached its international law obligations by passing laws that 
adversely impacted the ability of mining companies to do business in 
Mongolia.64  Specifically, the claimants objected to the enforcement 
of a disputed windfall profit tax law.  While the dispute was pending, 
 
 62. Id. ¶ 1. 
 63. Id. ¶ 69. 
 64. Sergei Paushok, CJSC Golden East Company and CJSC Vostokneftegaz 
Company v. The Government of Mongolia, UNCITRAL, Order on Interim 
Measures, ¶¶ 1–6 (Sept. 2, 2008). Paushok v. Mongolia is the first of two 
UNCITRAL cases discussed in this article. Both of these cases apply the 1976 
UNCITRAL Rules; as noted previously, there is no case to date under the 2010 
UNCITRAL Rules in which an investor has sought IMs to prevent a State from 
exercising its right to institute or continue criminal proceedings. 
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the claimants filed a request for interim measures asking, among 
other things, that Mongolia be directed to suspend any criminal 
action against the claimants or their investments.65 
In its Order on Interim Measures, the tribunal held that it had 
authority to issue IMs only if a five-factor test was satisfied: (1) 
prima facie jurisdiction; (2) prima facie establishment of the case; (3) 
urgency; (4) imminent danger of serious prejudice (necessity); and 
(5) proportionality.66  Carefully noting that, in spite of the first two 
factors, the tribunal was not prejudging the jurisdiction and merits of 
the case, it held that the claimants’ request met these five 
requirements and granted the requested interim relief in full.67  
Notably, however, the tribunal did not specifically direct Mongolia to 
suspend the criminal prosecutions against the claimants, but rather 
directed both parties to refrain from actions that could further 
aggravate the dispute, which presumably included Mongolia’s pursuit 
of criminal actions against the claimants. 
 I. Chevron v. Ecuador 
The claimants in Chevron instituted an UNCITRAL proceeding 
upon the issuance of a domestic Ecuadorian court judgment holding 
Chevron liable for over US$18 billion in environmental damages.68  
In this ongoing arbitration, the claimants argue, among other things, 
that the Ecuadorian judgment constitutes a denial of justice and that 
Ecuador has violated a host of protections to which the claimants are 
entitled under the Ecuador-United States BIT.69 
Starting before the commencement of the arbitration and 
continuing on and off throughout the proceeding, the respondent 
State pursued criminal investigation and charges against some of the 
claimants’ attorneys, and certain witnesses now supporting the 
claimants, on the grounds of their involvement in the environmental 
remediation that forms part of the basis of the environmental 
judgment in Ecuador.70  On multiple occasions and on many bases, 
 
 65. Id. ¶ 12. 
 66. Id. ¶ 45. 
 67. Id. ¶ 91 et seq. 
 68. Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Corporation v. The Republic 
of Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-23, Claimants’ Supplemental 
Memorial on the Merits, ¶ 1 (Mar. 20, 2012). 
 69. See id. ¶ 3 (“The evidence in this case proves that Ecuador has committed a 
denial of justice and various violations of Claimants’ rights under the BIT.”). 
 70. Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Corporation v. The Republic 
of Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-23, Third Interim Award on 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, pt. I, at 9 (Feb. 27, 2012). 
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the claimants have sought IMs, including requesting an order that 
Ecuador refrain from continuing the criminal proceedings against the 
claimants’ counsel in Ecuador.  This dispute is ongoing and the 
tribunal has issued no fewer than seven Interim Measures Orders and 
Awards directing both parties to maintain the status quo ante.71 
III. DISTILLED PRINCIPLES 
As the discussion above shows, the case law on IMs to enjoin a 
State from instituting or continuing criminal investigations or 
prosecutions against investors is far from uniform, but nevertheless, a 
few general principles can be distilled that may provide some useful 
guidance to parties facing parallel criminal prosecutions. 
First, although some tribunals add other factors, all tribunals 
have required a showing that IMs will serve to protect certain 
identified, existing rights, and that such measures are both necessary 
and urgent.  While this seems to be the core threshold test for 
granting IMs to enjoin criminal proceedings, tribunals retain 
discretion to consider a host of other factors, including, for example, 
prima facie establishment of the case.72 
Second, most tribunals expressly recognize the right of the State 
to conduct criminal investigations and institute criminal proceedings.  
As such, tribunals remain highly deferential to the State’s rights and 
are reluctant to award IMs that might impinge on the State’s 
prerogatives.  In recognition of these dynamics, arbitral tribunals 
have stated that they impose a particularly high threshold on requests 
for IMs.  Nevertheless, in the nine cases discussed above, four 
tribunals granted requests for IMs to enjoin the institution or 
continuation of criminal proceedings73 and in one additional case, the 
tribunal denied in part and granted in part the request for IMs.74  In 
only three of the nine cases did the tribunals deny a request for IMs to 
enjoin criminal proceedings.75 
 
 71. See Mouawad & Silbert, supra note 4, at 389–92 (discussing each of these 
orders). 
 72. See supra Part II.H. 
 73. See supra Part II.B, E, H, and I. 
 74. See supra Part II.D. 
 75. See supra Part II.A, C, and G. Technically, the tribunal in Lao Holdings 
also denied the applicant’s request regarding IMs, but since in that case, the 
respondent initially agreed to the IMs and later requested a modification thereof, 
which was denied, it does not properly belong in the category of cases denying 
requests for IMs to enjoin criminal proceedings. 
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Third, tribunals ordinarily will not grant requests for IMs where 
criminal proceedings are at issue unless a cognizable right of a party 
to the arbitration is directly affected.76  The impact of the criminal 
proceedings must be felt by the party to the arbitration, not merely its 
affiliated entities. 
Fourth, a mere threat of criminal prosecution or investigation 
without more usually will not be sufficient to warrant granting IMs to 
enjoin potential future criminal proceedings.77 
Fifth, IMs to enjoin the commencement or continuation of 
criminal proceedings are more likely to be granted where they are 
connected with evidentiary issues that may impact the tribunal’s own 
deliberations.78 In Von Pezold and Quiborax, for instance, the 
criminal proceedings directly impacted the investor’s ability to 
gather, maintain, or gain access to evidence relevant to the 
international arbitration, thereby threatening the integrity of the 
arbitral process itself and the legitimacy of the ultimate arbitral 
award. 
Finally, it appears that a State requesting a reversal or 
modification to an existing provisional measures award enjoining 
criminal proceedings will need to carry the same burden as a party 
seeking to obtain the protection to begin with.79  Once the tribunal has 
found that the heightened threshold for awarding IMs in the criminal 
proceedings context is met, there is an apparently equally high 
threshold to show that the risk previously justifying the IMs no 
longer persists.  There is, however, only one case for this proposition 
and it remains to be seen whether more requests of this kind emerge. 
CONCLUSION 
As is clear from the discussion above, the intersection between a 
sovereign’s right to enforce its criminal laws and international 
investment arbitration is rife with possibilities for conflict.  
Admittedly, IMs to enjoin the institution or continuation of criminal 
proceedings pose a conceptual challenge: investment tribunals are 
granted limited powers by the disputing parties to decide essentially 
monetary disputes over investments; they have no jurisdiction to 
deliberate criminal allegations and yet IMs to enjoin criminal 
 
 76. See supra Part II.G. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See supra Part II.E and D. 
 79. See supra Part II.F. 
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proceedings could be viewed as venturing into this territory.  But 
while a tribunal’s issuance of IMs that interfere with a State’s 
sovereign power to prosecute crimes may appear to overstep the 
tribunal’s proper powers, they are in fact a necessary corollary of the 
investor’s right to access investment arbitration as an alternative 
forum to domestic courts and criminal prosecutions can be, and have 
been, used to try to prejudice this right. 
One of the primary rationales underlying the investment 
arbitration regime is that foreign investors often fear the prospect of 
being at the mercy of potentially biased domestic courts.  In Host 
States facing political tumult, which is a frequent contributing factor 
to the violation of an investor’s rights, or in countries with a tradition 
of strong governmental influence over the judiciary, this risk is 
especially pronounced.  This type of atmosphere is fertile breeding 
ground for abuses of prosecutorial power.  Now that many investors 
have access to investment arbitration, the risk of being subjected to a 
biased domestic court, which is at times designed solely to wreak 
havoc on the arbitral process, must not be allowed simply to find 
another outlet in the form of the State’s exercise of its prosecutorial 
power.  It would also circumvent the purpose of having BITs to begin 
with as the investor would still be subject to foreign courts (and at 
risk of worse outcomes), and the unchecked exercise of the State’s 
prosecutorial power may aggravate the investor-State dispute and 
taint the entire arbitration process, especially where evidentiary 
issues are impacted.  Investment tribunals’ recognition of their power 
to order IMs in the criminal prosecution context is thus essential to 
the integrity of investment arbitration and the protection of the 
investor’s access to arbitration. 
At the same time, as international investment arbitration is 
coming increasingly under fire,80 it is important that the intersection 
with domestic criminal law should not become additional fuel to the 
flame.  Investment tribunals are, as the discussion above 
demonstrates, careful to note their respect for the Host State’s 
prosecutorial power, and yet about half of the tribunals granted 
investors’ requests for IMs that impinge on precisely that power.  
This is not to say that those IMs were improperly ordered.  On the 
contrary, it may be an indication that States are shifting the exercise 
of their power over investors to the prosecutorial branch.  Whichever 
 
 80. A number of States are considering withdrawing from ICSID and some 
already have, including Bolivia and Ecuador, both of which were respondents in 
successful requests for IMs to enjoin criminal proceedings. See supra Part II.D, B, 
and I. 
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the case may be, given the proliferation of investment arbitrations we 
can expect to see many more requests for IMs to enjoin criminal 
prosecutions in the future and tribunals must be on guard to discern 
which requests are legitimate and which requests constitute attempts 
by investors to use investment arbitration to escape answering 
legitimate criminal allegations. 
 
 
